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5 Winter 2019

On the Employment of Armor

by MAJ Amos C. Fox

The May-June 1998 issue of ARMOR

ran an article entitled "The Principles

of the Employment of Armor." The ar-

ticle initially supported institutional

education post-World War II as it was

included in Special Text No. 28 at Fort

Knox, KY. The article provides a salient

framework by which to understand ar-

mor's purpose and utility on the bat-

tlefield.1 However, very few articles

since "The Principles of the Employ-

ment of Armor" have captured the es-

sence of armor, especially given the

evolution in war between its publica-

tion and today.

Real-world considerations necessitate

a fresh look at the employment of ar -

mor. To be sure, the re-emergence of

conventional land warfare in the Cau-

casus region of Eurasia and Eastern Eu-

rope in the preceding decade has

raised the need for re-examining the

principles and ethos on which armor is

employed.

Tanks played a central role in the Rus-

so-Georgian War of 2008, while mech-

anized warfare dominated the initial

battles of the Russo-Ukrainian War

(2014-present). Stepping away from

Eurasia, armor continues to factor into

the long-burning conflagrations in the

Middle East. Most notable, the Iraqi

Army's 9th Armored Division was a fore-

most figure in the defeat of the Islam-

ic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) during

Operation Inherent Resolve. The 9th

Iraqi Armored Division, along with the

Iraqi Security Forces' Counter-Terrorist

Service, did yeoman's work during the

battle for Ramadi (2014) and the siege

of Mosul (2016-2017). Furthermore,

and much to the chagrin of the U.S.

Army and the U.S.-led coalition to de-

feat ISIS, Iraq's 9th Armored Division

spearheaded the short-lived campaign

to quell the Iraqi Kurd independence

movement in October 2017.2

To a lesser degree, armor has played a

continuous role in Syria. Russian prox-

ies and private military companies con-

tinue to employ armor to assist Syrian

president Bashar al-Assad in his incre-

mental reappropriation of territory

from rebels and ISIS in Syria. This use

of armor, veiled for a good portion of

the Syrian civil war and counter-ISIS

fight, came to the forefront in Febru-

ary 2018 when U.S. forces struck the

Russian proxy, the Wagner Group, kill-

ing hundreds of Russians in the pro-

cess. The strike, a defensive measure

taken by U.S. forces to protect a spe-

cial-operations outpost in the Syrian

desert, destroyed multiple Russian

tanks, laying bare the fact that armor

is not isolated to the undulating terrain

of Eastern Europe.3

As a result of life being breathed back

into armored warfare, the U.S. Army

Figure 1. Selection process for the forms of warfare. (Graphic by MAJ Amos C. Fox)

6 Winter 2019

recently decided to increase the num-

ber of armored brigade combat teams

(ABCTs) by one, raising the number of

ABCTs in the Active Component from

11 to 12.4 Further, this transition will

increase the number of combined-

arms battalions, the contemporary

heart of the U.S. Army's armored force,

by three and will result in one cavalry

squadron shifting from lightly armored

Stryker reconnaissance-and-security

(R&S) formations to armored-cavalry

squadrons. While this transition is not

expected to be complete until the end

of 2020, the need to educate and train

armored leaders is critical to this ef -

fort.

This article, similar to "The Principles

of the Employment of Armor," also pro-

vides a set of principles that should

govern the employment of armor on

the modern battlefield. However, this

article is not a facsimile of "Principles."

Instead, the values listed here are a

modern interpretation of the needs

and uses for armor on the battlefield.

Moreover, and similar to the original

"Principles of the Employment of Ar-

mor," this work reminds the reader

that the principles listed herein are a

mental model, a tool for thinking about

employing armor; it is not a "one-size

fits all" dictum. To that end, it must be

noted that skill, judgment and the sit-

uation's conditions play an equally im-

portant role in the employment of ar -

mor, as does any doctrine, set of prin-

ciples or theories.

With the scene now set, it is time to re-

view a modern set of thoughts on the

employment of armor.

Principle 1

Armored warfare is mobile warfare,

not maneuver warfare. Armored war-

fare, like any other martial variant, is

conditional. The conditions, dominat-

ed by the physical environment and

one's adversary, do more to dictate the

manner in which a force fights than

does one's doctrine or institutional

preference for warfighting. The resul-

tant effect is that armor must be adept

at thinking and fighting mobile wars

of maneuver, positional wars that ma-

nipulate the physical environment and

an opponent's cognitive bias, as well

as bludgeoning wars of attrition.5 In all

instances, mobility is the substance

that lubricates the engine of battle.

(Figure 1).

The U.S. Army maintains an arsenal of

guns, cannons and anti-tank weapons

that outrange the tank. Also, a throng

of vehicles exist within the Army's stra-

tegic motorpool that provide protec-

tion. However, mobility – tactical and

operational – is armor's distinctive fea-

ture. This feature is brought about by

the nexus of firepower, protection and

crew mobility. Armor leaders must

never forget that the ability to move

rapidly – whether from intervisibility

line to intervisibility line, or from one

operational objective to the next – is

where armor's true battlefield value

lies. As a result, armor leaders must

think in terms of mapsheets and not

grid squares. Mobility isn't reserved

for offensive action but also provides

a distinct advantage in the defense as

well. Mobility in the defense provides

armor leaders flexibility and options

while providing the opportunity to

counterpunch. Further, armor leaders

must understand that logistics and

maintenance are the lifeblood of ar -

mor's tactical and operational mobility,

and therefore they mustn't short-shrift

functions. Failure to develop a logistics

and maintenance mindset will under-

cut the ability of armor to put its dis-

tinctive feature – tactical and opera-

tional mobility – into use in combat.

Further, mobile warfare or armored

warfare is not maneuver warfare.

Moreover, the trope, "maneuver is ma-

neuver," which is often overheard

when one is brushing aside the polar-

ity among armor, cavalry or infantry in

battle, illustrates a significant deprav -

ity in understanding land warfare. Ar-

mor embodies mobile warfare, which

is significantly different from cavalry

operations or infantry-centric land

warfare. Armor's protection, mobility

and firepower allow it to move faster,

farther and with more gusto and pa-

nache than its lightly armed, foot-pow -

ered counterparts in the infantry. Ar -

mor's purpose – employment of mobil-

ity to penetrate, exploit and pursue –

make it distinctly ill-suited for purpose

of the cavalry and vice versa. Armor

leaders must appreciate the nuance

that resides among the combat arms

and be able to factor that into their un-

derstanding of how each arm thinks

and fights.

Principle 2

Armor dictates the tempo of engage-

ments and battles. By virtue of its tac-

tical and operational mobility, armor

dictates tactical tempo. Tempo and

speed go hand in hand and comple-

ment one another; however, it is im-

portant to note that tempo and speed

are not the same thing. Tempo is the

frequency and amount of activity in a

battle or campaign.6 Tempo is mea-

sured in degrees between high

Figure 2. Tempo in battles and campaigns is the frequency and amount of activity in battles and campaigns. (Graphic by

MAJ Amos C. Fox)

7 Winter 2019

frequency and low frequency (Figure

2). The ability to manipulate the fre-

quency and amount of activity in bat-

tle and campaigns is generally a result

of sufficient or excess resources and

not moving faster than one's oppo-

nent.

Furthermore, manipulating tempo in

battle is intentional and is commonly

the result of adding to existing offen-

sive action or deliberately using defen-

sive, positional, or attrition tactics to

slow down one's opponent. At the

same time, tempo can be positive or

negative. Positive tempo is increasing

the frequency of activity, while nega-

tive tempo is decreasing the frequency

of activity (Figure 3).

Speed, on the other hand, is scalar and

binary. Speed is the resultant effect of

the amount of time it takes to cover a

specific distance. Speed can be useful

in manipulating tempo, but speed is

not synonymous with tempo. Speed is

usually measured in terms such as fast

and slow.

The purpose of commanding tempo

and manipulating the speed of battle

is to keep an opponent on its back foot

and reactive. The goal of keeping an

opponent off balance is to economize

effort and the expenditure of resourc-

es in pursuit of one's respective objec-

tive.

To command tempo in battle and

campaigns, armor leaders must engage

in timely and thorough planning, en-

gaged and decisive leadership, and the

positive use of reconnaissance. MG Er-

nie Harmon wrote an excellent report

following World War II's North African

Campaign that highlights this point.

Harmon states that "[s]peed can be

made by rapid decisions, by going from

one reconnoitered place to another, by

thinking ahead and being prepared

with the solution for emergency when

it arises, and, above all, by forethought

as to how to handle the contingencies

of battle when they come up. … The

mark of a well-trained and superior

outfit is the deliberate and assured

way it goes into battle, checking every

Figure 3. Positive and negative tempo. (Graphic by MAJ Amos C. Fox)

Figure 4. Speed in warfare. (Graphic by MAJ Amos C. Fox)

8 Winter 2019

detail, seeing that everything is set,

making provisions for what will prob -

ably happen in the immediate future."7

While the conditions have changed, ar-

mor's ability change the tempo of bat -

tle – either increasing or decreasing

the frequency and speed of action – re-

mains as germane today as it did in the

deserts of North African in 1942. In ei-

ther case, the armor leader's role in

commanding the rhythm of battle is in-

dispensable.

Principle 3

Armor leaders are decisive and in-

volved. The very character of mobile

warfare – the ability to devour prodi-

gious swaths of land while bringing

combined arms to bear in battle –

mandates involved and decisive lead-

ership. To be sure, mobile warfare's ce-

lerity and harmonization of arms re-

quires engaged leadership from the

outset of the planning process. Unwel-

come and unneeded are leaders that

provide poor guidance, only show for

briefs, act as though the plan is that of

the staff and not their own, and refuse

to make substantive decisions. Leader

involvement is pivotal in the planning

and operations process because it cre-

ates the environment in which forma-

tions can move beyond reactive action

and instead dictate the sequence and

tempo of battle and operations.

To do so, armor leaders must sense the

pace and timing of battle and the abil-

ity to feel the influence of terrain on

tactical action. Involved and decisive

leaders then brandish these intangible

conditions to empower their forma-

tion, and those within their sphere of

influence, to "see the other side of the

hill," thus moving into a proactive pos-

ture. Many theorists, from Carl von

Clausewitz to B.H. Liddell Hart, refer to

these qualities as fingerspitzengefühle

or coup d'œil, and argue that they are

the result of genius. While innate men-

tal skill likely plays a role in fingerspit-

zengefühle and coup d'œil, what is

more important is a leader who cares

enough to be involved. Anemic minds

and uninvolved or lazy leadership are

anathema to the employment of ar-

mor. Individuals falling into those cat -

egories should be culled from the ar-

mored force at the first opportunity, as

they are not the type of leader armor

needs to thrive on the battlefield.

Principle 4

Armor penetrates, exploits and pur -

sues. Armor's purpose is not to line up

and smash into other armored forma-

tions. To be sure, this approach is anti-

thetical to combined-arms operations

and violates the tenets of combined-

arms warfighting theory.8 American

Figure 5. Battle map of the Sicilian Campaign. (Map by U.S. Military Academy Department of History)

9 Winter 2019

tanker LTG George S. Patton Jr. argued

that "[t]he primary mission of armored

units is the attacking of infantry and ar -

tillery. The enemy's rear is the happy

hunting ground for armor. Use every

means to get in there."9 Patton's 7th

Army during the Sicilian Campaign pro-

vides an instructive example.

The strike to Palermo, like Patton's oth-

er operations on the island, was under-

written by his infantry grabbing hold of

the retreating enemy, punching a hole

through the enemy's defenses through

the combination of cavalry, artillery

and infantry, and then feeding his ar -

mor through the resultant gaps. The

armor, then carrying the old horse cav-

alry's mantle, exploited the gaps by

penetrating and pursuing the enemy.

On Patton at Palermo, historian Mat -

thew Morton writes, "Marching [100]

miles in four days, the drive to Palermo

validated the 'indispensable role' of

the armored division. … [Patton] cred-

ited his success to a willingness to hold

back his tank units until the infantry

found the holes in the enemy line

through which to send the tanks 'in

large numbers and fast.'"10 (See Figure

5.) Armor formations must be condi-

tioned – mentally and physically – to

penetrate, exploit and pursue. No oth-

er formation in the U.S. Army possess-

es the innate capability to do so, and

therefore leaders must develop that

ethos within their formations.

Principle 5

Rugged ground cavalry drives armored

operations. Ground cavalry activities,

oriented on R&S operations, are a

proven means for enabling armored

warfare. On the other hand, aerial re-

connaissance as the primary means of

deep strike and R&S operations in

support of mobile land warfare has

proven unreliable at best. The most re-

cent and striking example can be found

in the shortcomings of 11th Attack Avi-

ation Regiment during the 2003 inva-

sion of Iraq, which saw the regiment's

deep-strike doctrine and aerial recon-

naissance foiled by very low-tech Iraqi

methods around Baghdad's southern

belt.11 Furthermore, unmanned aerial

vehicles and the new AH-64 Apache

helicopter-based air-cavalry formations

have yet to be proven in mobile land

warfare against a peer-competitor.

Until aerial reconnaissance and tech-

nocratic surveillance means prove

themselves in major combat opera-

tions against peer competitors, rugged

ground cavalry formations – proven

time and again throughout the history

of warfare – remain armor's primary

enabler in battle. As a result, tactical

Figure 6. The Ardennes area, 1944. (Map by U.S. Military Academy Department of History)

10 Winter 2019

armor leaders from the division down

to the tank crew must master the use

of its cavalry and scout formations.

Principle 6

Armor runs the marathon. "Armor

runs the marathon" is a metaphor.

While armored units are not con-

cerned with physically running 26.2

miles, they must condition themselves

for the marathon of battle. Perhaps the

apogee of armor running the marathon

is found in Patton's relief of 101st Air-

borne Division at Bastogne in Decem-

ber 1944. As is well noted, Patton

swung his 3rd Army 90 degrees to the

north and slammed into the Germans

besieging 101st Airborne Division at

Bastogne, Belgium. While in the attack,

3rd Army transitioned north and fought

for three straight days, closing the dis-

tance between it and the town of Bas-

togne before making contact with the

Germans Dec. 26, 1944. Upon making

contact, 4th Armored Division, the

spearhead of Patton's 3rd Army, pene-

trated the German perimeter at Bas-

togne, linked up with 101st Airborne Di-

vision and fought on for several more

days before being able to take a knee

and catch its breath.12 (Figure 6.)

The U.S. 3rd Infantry Division's three-

week odyssey to capture Baghdad in

the 2003 invasion of Iraq is a more re-

cent example of armor's ability to run

the marathon. In light of this often-

overlooked requirement, armor lead-

ers must focus on developing forma-

tions and Soldiers who are mentally

and emotionally able to persist in the

face of fatigue, hunger and depravity.

While infantrymen tend to focus more

on the physically element of fitness, ar -

mor in battle must be more mentally

and emotionally fit to cope with and

overcome the rigors of tempo and long

ground movement. (Figure 7.)

Principle 7

Armored units and leaders know how

to fight. Data, Digital Training Manage-

ment System training statistics and

"green gum balls" on quarterly train-

ing-briefing slides do not measure or

articulate an armored unit's ability to

fight. These metrics provide comfort to

commanders and leaders in various

meetings, yet none of this information

gets at the heart of whether or not an

armored unit can fight.

Two conditions determine whether or

not an armored unit can fight: 1) an ar-

mored unit knows how to fight (i.e.,

possesses the requisite technical and

tactical knowledge) and 2) an armored

unit is capable of fighting (i.e., possess-

es the requisite skill or the physical

Figure 7. Southern Iraq and vicinity, 2003. (Map by U.S. Military Academy Department of History)

11 Winter 2019

application of the requisite technical

and tactical knowledge). Both these

conditions are intangible and not eas-

ily measured in quantifiable value, but

instead are measured through the art

of command. Commanders and staffs

assess the ability of their unit's capa-

bility to effectively engage in battle

through first-hand observation while

putting their unit through its paces in

tough, realistic training.

Further, preparing for battle means

stepping beyond the confines of exist-

ing doctrine and educating one's for-

mation on the character of war.

Contemporary warfare is dominated by

three types of warfare: proxy warfare,

positional warfare and attrition war-

fare. (Editor's note: Please see Fox's ar -

ticle, "A Solution Looking for a Prob-

lem: Illuminating Misconceptions in

Maneuver-Warfare Doctrine," in AR-

MOR's Fall 2017 edition, http://www.

benning.army.mil/Armor/eARMOR/

content/issues/2017/Fall/4Fox17.pdf.)

None of these forms of warfare are ad-

dressed in U.S. Army doctrine, which is

precariously focused on maneuver

warfare. Nevertheless, proxy, position-

al and attritional environments, or a

combination thereof, is where armor

will find itself committed for the fore-

seeable future. Armor leaders must

push themselves and their formations

to look beyond the cozy confines of

thinking and training for how the U.S.

Army wants to fight and instead think

about and train for how it will fight.

Moreover, armor leaders should liber -

ate themselves from metric-focused

parameters for assessing warfighting

capability and instead get into the field

training and assess their formations.

Principle 8

Armor fights from the hatch. Armored

formations are built for unencumbered

activity. They are not meant to be teth-

ered, whether digitally or physically, to

static command posts (CPs). The no-

tion that armored divisions, in a con-

vention fight against a peer competi-

tor, will have the time to establish an

elaborate array of tentage for CPs is

fallacious. Further, this point becomes

even more striking as one moves down

the tactical ladder, from the division to

the battalion- and company-level. On

a mobile battlefield against peer

competitors, an array of tents does lit-

tle but invite attack, create require-

ments that slow down armored opera-

tions and disrupt armored formations

from fighting in accordance with their

raison d'être. The battle and campaign

are best served when armored forma-

tions are unleashed and allowed to

wreak havoc against their adversary.

The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war

serves as an instructive example of

why armored formations should not be

tethered to digitally enhanced, static

CPs. In the early morning hours of July

11, 2014, the Ukrainian 24th Mecha-

nized Brigade, 72nd Mechanized Bri-

gade and 79th Armored Brigade were

laagered in an assembly area preparing

to launch an offensive in the Luhansk

oblast.13 The purpose of the upcoming

operation was to retake lost territory

and to defeat Russian and separatist

forces in Luhansk. At about 4:30 a.m.,

the Ukrainians lost the ability to com-

municate due to Russian cyber and

electronic attack. The formations,

prostrate and unable to communicate,

were then ruthlessly attacked by Rus-

sian multiple-launch rockets and run-

of-the-mill tube artillery.14 The attack

crippled the assembled Ukrainian bri-

gades.

Reports indicate that the thrust left 30

Ukrainian soldiers dead and another

several hundred injured, and destroyed

well over two battalions' worth of ve-

hicles and equipment.15 The Russian

strike at Zelenopillya is a cautionary

tale about the perils of keeping armor

static on the battlefield and being

overly reliant on a digital infrastruc-

ture. U.S. Army armor, from the pla-

toon to the division, must break from

the digital leash and fight from the

hatch. To do otherwise risks quick de-

tection and rapid destruction on the

modern battlefield.

Principle 9

Armor is a weapon of opportunity.

Building on the idea of armor being

employed in accordance with its raison

d'être, armor's mobility makes it

uniquely suited to capitalize on win-

dows of tactical and operational op-

portunity. Writing on the U.S. Army's

armored divisions leading into World

War II, MG Bruce Magruder wrote that

"[t]he armored division is a weapon of

opportunity. Through its speed, fire-

power and flexibility of maneuver, it is

capable of surprising the enemy and

attacking him before he is capable of

defense."16

Although Magruder was writing about

U.S. armored divisions, the principle

transcends the defined echelon and in-

stead applies to the function of armor.

Armor exists to exploit temporal or sit-

uational windows of opportunity. Ar-

mor leaders and their formations must

be in tune with the flow of battle and

be mentally prepared for rapid repur-

posing to take advantage of the fleet-

ing prospects of providence.

Conclusion

The previously published "The Princi-

ples of the Employment of Armor" set

the course for thinking about armor

operations upon its initial publication.

However, time, an evolving threat en-

vironment and technological changes

necessitate a fresh look at those prin-

ciples. Modern armed conflict contin-

ues to illustrate that armored warfare

isn't going anywhere; it is just adapting

to its political, physical and threat en-

vironment.

Armor's defining characteristic, tacti-

cal and operational mobility, remains

just as relevant today as it was when

the initial principles were published.

Mobility remains armor's baseline, and

everything else armor does serves to

retain that mobility. That idea – mobil-

ity is what sets armor apart from the

other combat arms – is what underpins

this work and helped generate the up-

dated principles for the employment

of armor, which are restated following:

• Principle 1: Armored warfare is

mobile warfare, not maneuver

warfare;

• Principle 2: Armor dictates the tempo

of engagements and battles;

• Principle 3: Armor leaders are

decisive and involved;

• Principle 4: Armor penetrates,

exploits and pursues;

• Principle 5: Rugged ground cavalry

drives armored operations;

• Principle 6: Armor runs the marathon;

• Principle 7: Armored units and

leaders know how to fight;

• Principle 8: Armor fights from the

12 Winter 2019

hatch; and

•Principle 9: Armor is a weapon of

opportunity.

These principles are not meant to

serve as a checklist to drive armor op-

erations. Instead, they are proffered as

a mental framework for leaders to

think about when framing the employ-

ment of armored formations. Seminal

armored-warfare theorist Liddell Hart

reminds the student of war that "[t]he

influence of thought on thought is the

most influential factor in history. Yet,

being intangible, it is less perceptible

than the effects of action and has re-

ceived far less attention from writers

of history."17 The principles listed here-

in are intended to help shape the

thought on thought as it relates to the

modern employment of armor.

Armor, the combat arm of decision,

still holds a special place on the battle-

field. Because of this, armor leaders

must have a clear understanding of

why armor exists and how it should be

employed. The principles listed in this

article, building on those tendered fol-

lowing World War II, are a place to be-

gin that discussion.

MAJ Amos Fox is a student at the

School of Advanced Military Studies,

Fort Leavenworth, KS. Previous assign-

ments include commander, Troop L, 2nd

Squadron, 16th Cavalry Regiment, 199th

Infantry Brigade, Fort Benning, GA;

commander, Company D, 1st Squadron,

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR),

Fort Irwin, CA; assistant operations of-

ficer, 1st Squadron, 11th ACR, Fort Irwin;

commander, Headquarters and Head-

quarters Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cav-

alry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry

Division, Fort Carson, CO; and assistant

operations officer, 2nd Battalion, 8th In-

fantry Regiment, 2/4 Infantry Division,

Fort Carson. MAJ Fox's military educa-

tion includes Command and General

Staff College, Airborne School, Maneu-

ver Captain's Career Course, Cavalry

Leader's Course, Bradley Fire Support

Vehicle Course and Field Artillery Offi-

cer Basic Course. He holds a bachelor's

of science degree in secondary educa-

tion from Indiana University-Purdue

University at Indianapolis and a mas-

ter's of arts degree in secondary edu-

cation from Ball State University. MAJ

Fox's awards include the Draper Armor

Leadership Award, Fiscal Year 2013;

member of 11th ACR's honorary rolls;

and the Order of St. George (Bronze).

He is also a recipient of Silver Spurs.

Notes

1 "The Principles of the Employment of

Armor," ARMOR , May-June 1998.

2 Shawn Snow, "U.S. Abrams Tanks Sway

the Battle in Kirkuk," Army Times, Oct. 19,

2017; accessed Nov. 18, 2018, https://

www.armytimes.com/flash-

points/2017/10/19/us-abrams-tanks-

sway-the-battle-in-kirkuk/.

3 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, "How a Four-Hour

Battle Between Russian Mercenaries and

U.S. Commandos Unfolded," New York

Times, May 24, 2018; accessed Sept. 24,

2018, https://www.nytimes.

com/2018/05/24/world/middleeast/

american-commandos-russian-mercenar-

ies-syria.html.

4 U.S. Army Public Affairs, "Army An-

nounces Conversion of Two Brigade Com-

bat Teams," June 20, 2018; accessed June

21, 2018, https://www.army.mil/

article/211368/?st.

5 Amos Fox, "A Solution Looking for a

Problem: Illuminating Misconceptions in

Maneuver-Warfare Doctrine," ARMOR ,

Fall 2017.

6 Robert Leonhard, Fighting by Minute:

Time and the Art of War, Westport, CT:

Praeger Publishers, 1994.

7 Ernest Harmon, Notes on Combat Expe-

rience During the Tunisian and African

Campaigns.

8 Robert Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver:

Maneuver-Warfare Theory and AirLand

Battle, New York: Ballatine Books, 1991.

9 George S. Patton Jr., War as I Knew It,

New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1975.

10 Matthew D. Morton, Men on Iron Po-

nies, DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois Univer-

sity Press, 2009.

11 Micheal R. Gordon and Bernard E.

Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the

Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, New

York: Vintage Books, 2006.

12 Martin Blumenson, Patton: The Man

Behind the Legend, 1885-1945, New York:

William Murrow Books, 1985.

13 Amos Fox, Hybrid Warfare: The 21st

Century Russian Way of War, mono-

graph, School of Advanced Military Stud-

ies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2017, http://

www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/

u2/1038987.pdf.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Bruce Magruder, The Armored Division,

Officers' School, 1st Armored Division

Conference No.3, Fort Knox, KY, 1941.

17 B.H. Liddell Hart, The Ghost of Napo-

leon, New Haven, CT: Yale University

Press, 1934.

Acronym Quick-Scan

ABCT – armored brigade combat

team

ACR – armored-cavalry regiment

CP – command post

ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

R&S – reconnaissance and security

Principles of the

employment of

armor:

•Principle 1: Armored

warfare is mobile warfare,

not maneuver warfare;

•Principle 2: Armor dictates

the tempo of engagements

and battles;

•Principle 3: Armor leaders are

decisive and involved;

•Principle 4: Armor penetrates,

exploits and pursues;

•Principle 5: Rugged ground

cavalry drives armored

operations;

•Principle 6: Armor runs the

marathon;

•Principle 7: Armored units

and leaders know how to

fight;

•Principle 8: Armor fights

from the hatch; and

•Principle 9: Armor is a

weapon of opportunity.

ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.

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Shawn Snow

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How a Four-Hour Battle Between Russian Mercenaries and U.S. Commandos Unfolded

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A Solution Looking for a Problem: Illuminating Misconceptions in Maneuver-Warfare Doctrine

Amos Fox

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The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq

Cobra Trainor
Ii

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Amos Fox
Hybrid Warfare

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The Armored Division, Officers' School, 1 st Armored Division Conference